Take that business of balanced employment of forces. Admiral Doenitz, as you know, has, since becoming a captive of the Allies, written an essay on “The War at Sea” from the German point of view of World War II. He points out that the German submarines in the first year of the war were ten times as effective per day at sea as they were in the second year of the war. One therefore gathers (though he doesn’t make this point) that if Germany had started the war with some 300 submarines instead of 60, they would have stood a very good chance of winning the war at sea, and therefore the whole war-and relatively early. Now, why didn’t they have those 300 submarines? Well, one reason is that they were enamored of the idea of a balanced force and devoted a good deal of their naval resources (which had to be limited in view of their ground and air force needs) to surface vessels, including battleships. That gave them what according to a static conception was a balanced force. The trouble was that it was highly unbalanced for a war with Great Britain. This is only one example of where the word “balance” denotes no ready answer. The balance must always be thought of in terms of strategic needs against the particular prospective enemy.

Bernard Brodie, “Characteristics of a Sound Strategy” (1952)